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Army Supplies in the Forward 
Area and the Tumpline System 
A First World War Canadian 
Logistical Innovation 
F.R. Phelan 
Editor's Note: In British Logistics on the Western Front. 1914-1919 (Praeger, 1998), IanM. Brown documents 
the problems of maintaining an army in the field: throughout that war, supply lines were strained to get 
food, equipment and ammunition forward. Early problems of adequate supplies were replaced by an 
inability to get the items from depots to where they were required. Some of these latter problems were 
blamed on "establishments" and other force-structure problems caused by stripping logistical-support 
units to meet the manpower needs of the fighting units. The decision to dramatically reduce the size of the 
BEF divisions in France helped reduce pressures. By stripping a battalion out of each brigade, and using 
the menfreed as replacements, the BEF maintained its paper strength in divisions (though, infact, the 
strength went considerably down) and, more importantly, also reduced its overall logistical requirements. 
But, as Brown writes: 
The Canadian Corps successfully resisted this "downsizing," as its commander opposed the reduction 
vehemently. In fact. he managed to increase the effective size and strength of his divisions by using the 
manpower[ rom the two [sic] Canadian divisions forming in Britain. This gave Haig a single very strong 
co1ps -Jour overstrength divisions amounting to some one hundred thousand men (forty-eight thousand 
i11[cmt.ry) - but it also gave his administration a supply problem, since the standard divisional pack could 
not supply a Canadian division. In spite of this trouble, it did not appear to cause great d!lficulLy on the 
lines of comnmnication. Indeed. it gets no mention in either the QMG's or AG's diaries .... (pp.l65-166) 
Buried in tl1is passage lay two secrets. The four-battalion brigades perhaps (too simply?) explain the use of 
the Canadian Corps as Haig's "shock troops." But as Brown notes, how the Canadians maintained these 
larger formations is not clear from British sources (p. 1 77). The answer to this secret must be sought 
elsewhere. One answer is F.R. Phelan's "tumpline." 
Some Difficulties of Supply in 
Trench Warfare 
~e supply of the Army in the forward area 
1. during a war such as we experienced in 1914-
1918 is a subject that might profitably be 
elaborated on until it filled many volumes. In 
these notes it is not my intention to touch on 
more than that portion of the subject of supply 
which seriously involved the question of 
manpower in the use of carrying parties after 
delivery of supplies by horse or mechanical 
transport. including light railways; to set forth 
the methods adopted in certain formations 
during the late war to overcome the difficulties 
and to make suggestions for consideration during 
any future campaigns. 
To illustrate the difficulties that generally 
confronted the troops in connection with supply 
in the forward or trench area I will describe the 
experiences of the 11th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, to which I was attached as Staff Captain, 
and try and set forth the problems that faced it 
and the methods adopted to overcome same. 
This article was originally published in Canadian 
Defence Quarterly, vol.VI, October 1928, pp.20-33. 
©Canadian Military History. Volume 9, Number l, Winter 2000, pp.3l-45. 31 
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One of the first problems that confronted the 
whole brigade after its arrival at the front was 
the question of transporting supplies in the 
forward or trench area after delivery by the light 
railway or GS wagons at dumps or refilling 
points. 
Rations, water, ammunition, engineering and 
medical supplies all had to be placed at the 
disposal of the troops manning the trenches and 
to accomplish this with the least waste of 
manpower and material was a problem that had 
not been properly solved, although two years of 
war had passed when the II th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade arrived in France in August I9I6. 
During the brigade's tours of the first couple 
of months in the Ypres Salient, rations and other 
supplies were brought forward in the usual 
manner by detailing carrying parties from the 
battalions in the line or, where large quantities 
were required, by ordering the battalions in 
support and reserve to furnish the requisite 
number of men. 
Such a method was most wasteful of both 
time, manpower and material and was trying on 
the temper of all concerned. 
Guides were often not at the appointed place, 
or not punctual, causing frequent delays. 
Supplies were often not at the locations 
designated or were too plentiful or not sufficient 
for the size of the party detailed. These, of course, 
were faults that were due to inaccurate 
compilation of, or attention to, orders. The very 
size of the parties and the necessity of keeping 
together on account of lack of knowledge of the 
routes and having to depend on guides exposed 
the party to the chance of heavier casualties. 
This subject of carrying parties was one of 
the most irritating matters with which the Staff 
of the brigade and the HQ of the battalion had to 
deal and led to a great deal of bad feeling at times. 
From the platoon commander to the OC of the 
battalion, efforts were made to try not to be called 
upon to supply more than they were compelled 
to for the various working and carrying parties, 
as the supplying of these parties, besides tiring 
the men and making them "grouch," made it very 
difficult, and often hazardous, to hold the area 
properly with such a depleted unit. Of course care 
32 
was exercised not to call on the line battalions 
for more men than absolutely necessary, but there 
were usually big engineering jobs to be done 
which required men to work and men to carry 
material, and then there was the regular daily 
supply of water and rations, not to mention 
keeping the line dumps of ammunition up to the 
schedule laid down. 
The subject of the large use of manpower for 
these purposes was one which was being given 
very serious thought by all concerned when the 
first intimation came in the late summer of I9I6 
that the 4th Canadian Division might be sent to 
the Somme, where heavy fighting had been in 
progress since July I st. The brigade after being 
moved from the St. Eloi Sector, where they had 
their first trench warfare experience, to in front 
ofKemmel for a few days, was withdrawn about 
September 2I st to the Nordausque training area 
for ten days training prior to proceeding to the 
Somme, where the other Canadian divisions had 
been fighting so steadily and with such heavy 
losses for some weeks. 
Amongst the lessons that the fighting on the 
Somme had taught, was the necessity of properly 
organizing the supply arrangements for the 
forward area, and this, coming on top of our 
experience in the comparative quietness of 
warfare at that date in the Salient, brought the 
subject very much to our attention. 
The Somme in I9I6 was the first occasion 
when Canadian troops had been employed in 
offensive operations on a big scale and the mud 
combined with the distances to be covered had 
proved a serious obstacle to overcome, not only 
from a fighting, but also maintenance of supply 
standpoint. It was fortunate indeed for the 
brigade that information had been given it as to 
the supply situation, otherwise, green troops that 
they were, the battalions would have had a more 
difficult time than they did, as they found that 
all supplies had to be brought in either by pack 
animal or man a distance of over 5,000 yards 
during most of the two months tour, with the 
most appalling conditions, as far as the routes 
were concerned, to work under. As I was at that 
time Staff Captain it devolved upon me to draft 
any plans for meeting the supply situation that 
we were going to face. 
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The Tumpline 
Prior to the war I had done considerable hunting and fishing in the back woods of 
Quebec where the difficulties of transportation 
are very great and continuous movement by water 
impossible. In surmounting the difficulties of 
transporting canoes and supplies between lakes, 
or around bad falls or rapids, a very simple 
contrivance, called the 
"Tumpline," was used. 
without which the difficulties 
would be almost 
leather, for carrying loads. It is made up of three 
component parts; principal of which is the brow 
band 21" long by about 3" wide in the central 
portion and tapering until about 1" wide at each 
end. To each extremity is sewn a strap seven or 
more feet long, one inch wide where attached to 
brow band and tapering gradually until about 
v., at the free end. In addition to the sewing, rivets 
are sometimes added, two in each strap. to 
strengthen the joint. Where it is not possible to 
TUMP LINE 
I lt'l'H CANADIAN INF." BRIGADE. 
~;...,. .. _ .. __________ .. 21" ____ ....... _ ... _ .. 
insurmountable in many 
cases. as four and five miles 
over a very rough trail was 
no unusual distance to carry 
the outfit. I therefore 
suggested to the brigade 
commander that this method 
of transportation be adopted 
to meet the difficulties 
confronting us in forwarding 
supplies and that a special 
brigade company be formed 
for this purpose. He 
approved of the suggestion 
and ordered me to draw up 
the necessary instructions, 
detail the men for the com-
pany and obtain the material 
to manufacture the tump-
lines. This was done and 
demonstration given to the 
brigade staff and battalion of-
ficers, which proved to them 
the value of the method. 
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Before proceeding with a 
brief history of the work of 
the "Tumpliners," as they 
were called, it might be well 
for the sake of those who are 
not familiar with this method 
of transportation to give a 
description of the tumpline. 
its origin, the method of 
carrying and the military 
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A carrying party from the 11th Canadian Brigade Tumpline Company 
making their way towards the frontline, September 191 7. 
obtain straps seven feet long, two pieces can be 
joined together, although this joint sometimes 
interferes with the quick tying or untying of the 
knot. Tumplines made of canvas or web are 
absolutely useless, as they become soggy, stringy, 
and wrinkled when they get wet, and difficult to 
untie under these conditions, and also chafe the 
head. Good tumplines can be manufactured by 
any regimental saddler or shoemaker from 
salvaged surcingles and reins. 
It is impossible to give the exact date or the 
country of origin of the tumpline, or heads trap 
as it is sometimes called, but forms of it are to 
be found in countries in every portion of the globe 
where heavy loads have to be carried any 
considerable distance. In Canada, it has been 
used by both Indians and Whites since, and 
probably before, the days of the French regime, 
when the Voyageurs, or Coureurs-des-Bois, as 
the French Canadian trappers were called, had 
only two methods oftransportation, their canoes 
and their backs, and today, in the north country 
and backwoods, where other transportation 
facilities do not exist, nearly all loads have to be 
carried by the tumpline. It is no unusual thing to 
see a trapper or a bushman taking his winter 
supplies in over the trail; these men will often 
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carry a small barrel of salt pork and a sack of 
flour in one load, the weight running from 250 
to 350 pounds. The general rule. however. is that 
the load must not exceed the carrier's weight. In 
the north country, where the rivers are broken 
by many rapids, the river-men have to unload 
their scows, bring them through the rapids light, 
and portage all their goods with the tumpline. 
The method of carrying is the same in all 
countries, the underlying principle being that the 
weight is borne on the head and the pressure of 
the weight is in a straight line down the spine, as 
the spine can support with more ease heavy 
weights, while carrying them. than any other part 
of the body. This is well illustrated in the bulky 
and heavy weights carried on the top of the head 
by the natives of Africa and the East. 
To prepare for carrying with the tumpline, 
the load of boxes. sacks. etc., is piled up and 
tied together by passing one long strap round 
each end of the load and tying either with a timber 
hitch, or simply a half hitch with the free end as 
a bow so that same can be undone immediately. 
When the load consists of a number of small 
articles the usual method is to roll them in a 
blanket in conjunction with the tumpline. 
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The two ends being tied up leaves the wide 
brow band forming a loop. This loop is passed 
over the top of the head just above the brow and 
the load rests high up on the back. The length of 
the loop is determined by the tumpliner, and 
depends largely on his height and the position 
on his back that he prefers to carry his load. 
The tumpliner walks slightly bent forward 
and if he wishes can steady the load by holding 
the straps about the level of the ears. If the 
tumpliner is desirous of a change or a rest for 
the neck, the tumpline can he pulled down in 
front of the chest, allowing the straps to rest on 
the shoulders, and by passing the arm through 
the loop of the browband hold the load in 
position. By doing this, the weight rests on the 
shoulders assisted by the arm used to hold it 
there; this method makes a good change but is 
seldom resorted to except for very short 
distances. 
In preparing the load care should be taken 
that no projections are left on the side of the load 
that rests against the back, as it is impossible in 
that case to carry a load very far without the back 
becoming galled. 
The loads that are carried depend largely on 
the nature of the goods that are required to be 
moved, the distance to be covered, and the nature 
of the ground over which the tumpliner has to 
go. 
On the Somme, during the months of October 
and November 1916, under very adverse weather 
conditions, the Brigade Tumpline Company 
carried the following as loads, working nearly 
every night for 45 consecutive days traversing 
between 4000 to 5000 yards; this being the 
distance between the Main and Advanced Dumps. 
1 to 2 boxes small arms ammunition 
4 boxes Mills Grenades 
3 boxes Stokes Shells 
2 boxes Bully Beef 
1 case Biscuits 
1 bale Sandbags 
2 coils Barbed Wire 
l dozen Shovels 
1 dozen Picks 
On one occasion five complete Soyer Stoves and 
three 50-gallon iron tanks were forwarded the 
same distance by a party of eight men in one load. 
A more detailed list will be found at the end 
of these notes giving practically all the various 
articles that are required to be moved in the 
forward area, showing the size or nature of the 
load, the weight, the number of men required to 
A variety of items are being carried using the tumplime: rolls of wire mesh, rolls 
Q[ barbed wire and spiral pickets on which to string the barbed wire. 
35 
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~ 
A Canadian soldier makes his way out of the supply depot carrying his load using the tumpline 
while his companions prepare to get under way. Note the collection of rum jugs in the centre of the 
photo. 
carry the load with and without the tumpline, 
the percentage of manpower saved by using the 
tumpline, together with remarks on each class 
of load. 
As a general rule, almost any small article 
required in the forward area can be carried by 
the tumpline; under war conditions the weight 
should not exceed 75-100 lbs for regular work 
but this is governed largely by the bulk of the 
load. 
The 11th Canadian Brigade 
Tumpline Company 
I n ~rganizing f~r carrying on the work, the Bngade Tumplme Company was formed with 
an establishment of 1 officer, 4 NCOs and 80 
privates, divided into four equal sections; each 
battalion of the brigade furnishing one complete 
section, whilst the officer was detailed by the 
brigade from the battalion that had the fewest 
officers "on command." Experience proved that 
this made a very efficient, easily handled and, 
for most purposes, sufficiently large unit, and 
the original establishment was adhered to 
throughout the balance of the war. 
After the experience of the Somme, 1916, 
each battalion formed an additional section 
composed of 1 NCO and 15 to 20 men, depending 
on the strength of the battalion, to be used in 
forwarding the unit's rations and water to the 
front line, as well as to assist the brigade 
company in the forwarding of ammunition and 
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supplies in an emergency or during heavy 
operations. 
This latter development left the brigade 
company free to fulfill the brigade's 
responsibilities as far as supply was concerned 
in the area. This special company was completely 
segregated from the battalions, and acted as a 
separate unit under the orders of the brigade Staff 
Captain. 
The battalion sections were generally placed 
under the orders of the battalion Bombing Officer 
and were attached to the unit headquarters. 
Outside of the regular infantry equipment, 
each NCO and man was equipped with a 
tumpline, and, in addition, each battalion section 
had a number of special sacks, each capable of 
holding four or five sandbags of rations. which 
enabled one tumpliner to carry forward 32-40 
rations in one load. These sacks were made of 
waterproof canvas, and of a size that enabled the 
sandbags to be put in with the long side across 
tho top of the bag being closed up by folding over 
and tying with two thongs. Two "0" rings were 
sewn on one side about a quarter of the way down 
the sack, and fifteen inches from centre to centre, 
which enabled them to be used to hang on to a 
pack-saddle, when pack-animals were available 
and these rings served to attach the tumpline to 
when being packed by tumpliner. 
The men wore their box-respirators at the 
"alert" and when necessary could don their 
masks and continue their work (this was done 
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A corporal helps one of his soldiers to hoist his load while others adjust their tumplines. Leaving 
aside the question of weight. this photo clearly illustrates that the sheer bulk of the boxes being 
carried woald preclade their easy conveyance without aid of the tampline. 
on many occasions) but the work had then to be 
necessarily rather slow and tedious at night. 
The tumpline does not in any way interfere 
with the wearing of the steel helmet. 
The training of the men was very simple, no 
previous experience being required, although, of 
course, very useful. The men were first taught to 
tie up the load, and. after mastering the simple 
knots used, they were allowed to carry light loads 
short distances. with fairly long spells of physical 
exercises for the neck, back and shoulders, 
together with demonstrations from the instructor 
between "carries." For the first two or three days, 
they were not allowed to do much carrying, the 
great danger being that the men found the work 
so simple that they overdid it, thus getting a stiff 
neck, and were liable to get discouraged. Like 
every other work or exercise. which requires 
muscles not in constant use, the muscles have 
to become accustomed to the work, and with the 
tumpline this was best accomplished by light 
loads for the first two or three days, together with 
physical drill. When these points were observed 
it was found that in less than a week the men 
became very efficient in their work. 
Some Advantages of the Tumpline 
I n order to realize the benefits that the brigade secured by using this method of transportation, 
it is only necessary to consider some of the 
advantages, for, without attempting to make any 
extravagant claims for the tumpline, it may safely 
be said that one man equipped with it can do the 
work of two men carrying supplies in the ordinary 
way, do it quicker, and at the end be fresher than 
the two men would have been. 
Some of the advantages of the tumpline over 
other forms of carriers or methods of carrying, 
are as follows:-
(a) It weighs but a few ounces and therefore 
does not add materially to the weight of the load. 
(b) It can be very easily adjusted to the load; 
thus cutting down the time which parties would 
usually spend around a dump. This feature is 
especially valuable when loads have to be 
prepared under shell fire. 
(c) When the load has been delivered, the 
tumpliner throws his tumpline over his shoulder, 
bandolier fashion, and does not notice its weight 
37 
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or pressure any more than he would a regular 
bandolier; in fact not as much. This is not the 
case with more bulky forms of carriers which, 
as they are clumsy and have a considerable 
weight, are often considered a nuisance by the 
carrier, who is liable to ditch them if an 
opportunity offers. 
(d) If the carrying party comes under heavy 
shell fire suddenly, and it is advisable to take 
cover quickly, the load carried by the tumpliner 
can be dropped instantly, leaving the man free 
from any encumbrances and able to act with the 
least possible delay. With other forms of carriers, 
it often necessary to have the assistance of one 
or two other men to remove the load from the 
back. 
(e) When going through a trench, if a stretcher 
party or others are met, the tumpliner can easily 
throw his load on the parapet and allow the party 
to pass him; this cannot be so easily done with 
other carriers. This is also a big advantage when 
it is necessary to jump into or over a trench; the 
load can be dropped on the parapet or tossed 
across as the case may be, and the tumpliner 
can then easily jump into the trench or across 
and take up the load again; with a load strapped 
to the back, jumping over or into a trench is 
almost an impossibility; in the first place, the 
load would be almost sure to catch the edge of 
the trench and throw the man on his face, and in 
the second place the weight would in most cases 
prevent the man from being able to jump at all. 
If other forms of carriers were to be removed 
from the back and tossed across the trench, the 
weight of the load would be very liable to break 
the framework of the apparatus. 
(f) On arrival at destination the tumpliner's 
load can be instantly put down and untied 
without delay. 
(g) The load does not tire the tumpliner nearly 
as quickly as loads whose weight is supported 
by the shoulders. A tumpliner can shift the weight 
of his load from the brow to the shoulders at any 
time, or by a slight pressure of the hands can 
divide it between brow and shoulders. 
(h) The tumpline can be quickly made by any 
regimental shoemaker or saddler, its cost being 
small compared with other carriers, as salvaged 
leather can be used to a large extent. 
38 
(i) Practically no training is required to teach 
men to use the tumpline. 
(j) When used in muddy or wet weather, the 
tumpline will not become heavy or soggy from 
wet or mud, as wood or canvas carriers will. 
(k) Wet weather is liable to so shrink the 
canvas of other carriers, if the laces are not 
loosened, that the frames will be broken; the 
tumpline does not have to contend with this. 
(l) The amount of ground required at the 
dump by a large party, equipped with the 
tumpline, for loading up is very small compared 
to the way the carriers would have to spread out 
to load up other forms of packs. 
(m) One of the advantages of having a 
permanent company, is that the men quickly 
learn the location of dumps. the best routes, 
spots to be avoided, both on account of bad 
walking or shell and rifle fire, location of units, 
etc. 
(n) It was a rare thing to find that a tumpliner 
had ditched any part of his load; this could not 
be said of ordinary carrying parties. 
(o) When not required for forwarding of 
supplies, the compay was advantageously 
employed in salvage work. 
(p) The tumpliner can carry out slightly 
wounded cases, which, from the nature of their 
wounds, cannot walk, thus relieving a stretcher 
party. 
(q) That the men themselves like it, and 
consider the tumpline an easy form of carrying 
was evident by the fact, that, although they did 
far more work than they would do in the line, 
still they considered it a punishment if they were 
sent back to ordinary regimental duty. 
One very distinct advantage was noticed in 
the forwarding of cans of water. With the ordinary 
carrying party each man took two cans; these 
seldom arrived at the forward area more than 
half full, as it was found that the men were liable 
to spill some of the water to lighten the load, or, 
when passing working parties, to give a drink to 
the workers. It was therefore necessary to have 
double the quantity of cans and double the 
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss1/4
carrying party required for the amount needed 
for the line. 
The turnpliner carried three, and, for short 
distances, or where the trail was good, four petrol 
cans full, and thus greatly reduced the party 
required. If the can was not full, the water 
swished from side to side, ,and made the load 
more difficult to carry, therefore the tumpliner 
saw to it that he had a set of full cans. For the 
same reason, and because the cans were tied 
together, he did not give away his water en route. 
This again is a valuable fact, inasmuch that it 
was necessary to have undamaged cans, and, 
therefore, they were not so liable to become 
punched to allow the water to run freely, or the 
stoppers to be lost. 
Saving in Manpower 
'll ]bat a tremendous saving in manpower to 
VV the British Expeditionary Force and the 
other Allied Armies would have resulted from the 
Nature of Load: Vickers Gun 
Weight Q{ Load: 93 lbs. 
Usual Carrying Party: 2 men 
Percentage saved in manpower 
by use of tumpline: 50 percent 
general use of the tumpline along the lines 
inaugurated in the 11th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade can be readily realized by a little 
calculation. 
As, at the very least, all parties were cut down 
50 percent. (and in the forwarding of certain 
supplies the percentage was much higher) by 
using the tumpline, it requires very little 
imagination or figuring to see the value of this 
method of carrying. Basing the calculation on a 
50 percent. reduction in manpower and using 
one tumpline company of 85 per brigade, and 
one company for divisional troops, the saving in 
manpower in the BEF would have been well over 
20,000 men. In addition, if every infantry 
battalion had had its own tumpline section, and 
other units in the division in proportion, there 
would have been an additional saving of about 
10,000 men. This would have meant a total of 
over 30,000 men saved for other purposes almost 
every day, and in giving these figures a very 
conservative estimate is made, as the calculations 
are based on a lower number of divisions 
than we had in the field on the Western Front 
at the time they were made. 
At a time when reinforcements were so 
difficult to obtain, and the method of 
transportation in the forward area required 
so many men, it is unfortunate that the whole 
army did not have companies along these 
lines. The First Army was very aggressive on 
the subject after the method had been 
brought to the attention of the Staff and due 
to the energy of the MGGS most of the 
formations in the Army adopted the tumpline 
in the latter part of 1917 and early in 1918. 
I figured out at one time, from the reports 
that I had received from the various 
formations using the tumpline, 
Nature of Load: 4 18 "l.b shells 
Weight of Load: 96 lbs. 
Usual Carrying Party: 2 men 
Percentage saved in manpower 
by use of tumpline: 50 percent 
9
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approximately what amount of manpower was 
at that time being conserved in the limited portion 
of the Expeditionary Force concerned and my 
estimate ran well over a brigade's fighting 
strength. 
The Work of the 11th Brigade 
Tumpline Company 
~ record the activities, devotion to duty 
..1 and heroic actions of the members of the 
Brigade Tumpline Company and the battalion 
Nature of Load: 4 tins of water 
Weight qf Load: 1 04 lbs. 
Usual Carrying Party: 2 men 
Percentage saved in manpower 
by use of tumpline: 50 percent 
sections would require a volume in itself. That it 
was no bomb proof job was evident from the fact 
that the proportion of casualties was very high. 
Yet, despite this fact, the arduous duties 
performed, combined with the necessity for the 
unit being always on duty whilst the brigade 
occupied a sector, giving them practically little 
or no rest from the trenches, the men liked their 
work and the only punishment meted out was 
return to regimental duty. Probably the secret of 
the popularity of the work was the relief from 
the monotony of trench life and the realization 
of something accomplished after each night's 
duty. 
The first experiences of the company were 
amongst the worst that they had to go through. 
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and were during the preparation for the brigade's 
first big attack on the Somme in 1916. The men 
dug themselves in on the slopes of Sausage Valley, 
and worked from the main brigade dump 
forward to a new dump that they were ordered 
to establish in the famous sunken road running 
by Courcelette. The location chosen was down 
the slope towards Death Valley where the road 
forked to Pys and Miraumont; the dump was for 
supplies for use in the Regina Trench operations 
of the 21st October . 
Nature qf Load: 1 bale of sandbags 
Weight of Load: 115 lbs. (dry) 
Usual Carrying Party: 4 men 
Percentage saved in manpower 
by use qf tumpline: 75 percent 
A very short period was available in which to 
complete the work, and night after night these 
men, assisted by ordinary carrying parties drawn 
from the battalions, and the Brigade Pack Train, 
toiled over the 5,000 yards (nearly 3 miles) of 
that shell torn ground with their heavy loads. 
The Sugar Refinery, the cross roads at 
Courcelette and, above all, the Sunken Road were 
favourite spots for the Hun to straffe, yet never 
once did this little company of men fail to deliver 
their loads at the destination, despite many 
casualties. 
The heartbreaking part of that first task was 
that a few days before the attack on Regina 
Trench the Hun located the new dump and 
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completely destroyed it by shell fire. It was 
possible to salve some of the scattered 
ammunition and engineering material but the 
hundreds of water tins were riddled with 
shrapnel, the water all spilt and the tins rendered 
useless. This salvaging work was tedious and 
being done in the open in daylight brought a lot 
of harassing fire, with resultant casualties. 
The destruction of this dump was serious as 
it contained the reserves of ammunition, 
engineering material, water and rations for the 
projected attack. Immediate steps had to be 
taken in the few days remaining to replace it and 
this required the utmost speed and every ounce 
of energy that the men had. Fortunately, the rain 
was not present to turn the ground into the 
quagmire it later became, or human effort could 
not have acomplished what those men did. For 
the last few nights large additional carrying 
parties were detailed to the work, some coming 
from other brigades, and we had as many as 500 
additional men working at the job. 
The picture presented by these parties was a 
weird one. ihe nights were pitch dark and it was 
impossible to see much around one, except when 
the dim reflection from flares momentarily 
silhouetted the figures of the toiling men. Very 
little talking was indulged in except when 
complimentary remarks were made for the 
benefit of those who cared to listen when someone 
stumbled into a shell hole with his load, or 
stubbed his toe against some obstruction. 
The casualties on those last few nights were 
heavy, one officer Lt. E. Renouf, of the 54th, was 
killed and several officers wounded, whilst at 
least 20 percent of the other ranks were killed 
or wounded. 
To assist the Tumpline Company in all big 
operations, the Brigade Pack Train was called 
together, composed of riding and light draught 
horses and their drivers, to the number of 15 
from each battalion. Each battalion section was 
in charge of its own officer and whilst nominally 
under the charge of the Brigade Transport Officer, 
usually worked on its own initiative once the 
tasks were allotted. The Pack Train would usually 
work from the main dump to an advanced dump, 
and in every operation did yeoman service and 
assisted materially in the success of the supply 
arrangements. 
The Tumpline Company's activities did not 
cease with the completion of the dumps prior to 
the operation. The next task was to start moving 
forward the munitions to new positions, selected 
beforehand on the map, just as soon as the 
attacks had been successfully launched and the 
captured ground was being consolidated. This 
work usually occupied the first few hours of the 
operation. Then it was called upon to assist in 
removing the wounded and join the special 
parties of stretcher bearers that had been detailed 
for the purpose. 
The other operations on the Somme, in 1916, 
were, in a general way, a repetition of the first 
tasks but, with the experience gained, many of 
the troubles encountered in the first instance 
were avoided. 
Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele each 
presented their particular problems and passed 
on. During regular tours, between big operations, 
the work was routine, comparatively simple of 
accomplishment, and need not be dwelt upon. 
The battalion sections, which were a later 
development of the organization, were most 
useful, their efficiency naturally depending a good 
deal on the individual officer in charge of their 
activities. 
The 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
Tumpline Company was the first organization of 
its kind and made the first serious and consistent 
use of the tumpline in the war. Various claims 
have been laid to the credit of having introduced 
the tumpline on the Western Front; all probably 
were the first in their particular area; the trouble 
was that the method was not followed up or an 
organization formed until the 11th Brigade made 
it a success, and probably the first official 
recognition of this method is to be found in the 
First Army communiques and reports issued in 
July1917. 
Disadvantages of Normal 
Method of Carrying Supplies 
~e photographs included herewith show in a 
.l very graphic way the tremendous savings in 
manpower by the use of the tumpline. 
41 
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In considering or drawing up suggestions for 
the future, one must bear in mind that there are 
two questions that are of paramount importance 
in connection with supplies and their handling 
in the forward area, namely:-
(a) Cutting down of manpower. 
(b) Conservation, and economical use of all 
natures of supplies. 
The methods mostly used on the Western 
front for the forwarding of supplies in the forward 
area, were:-
(a) Light railways. 
(b) Pack animals. 
(c) Carrying parties. 
The light railway, when properly organized, 
is, during trench warfare, by far the most 
satisfactory method of forwarding supplies, on 
account of the large tonnage handled with a small 
personnel, the speed with which it can be moved, 
and the elimination of waste. But even on the 
most quiet fronts, trains are able to go forward 
only to certain points, from which supplies have 
to be transported to their final destination by 
pack animals or carrying parties. On a very active, 
or battle front, the difficulties of keeping the track 
through are very great, and practically very little 
use can be made of the line forward of the field 
gun positions, if that far, and recourse has to be 
made to other methods of transportation. 
Pack animals were used with much success 
during the past campaign but the shortage of 
animals was a serious handicap to this method 
and the fact that they were compelled to keep 
certain routes, or tracks, and the impossibility 
of ever protecting either the men or animals from 
shell fire, resulted in heavy casualties on a battle 
front. 
The last method, carrying parties, composed 
of men drawn usually from infantry battalions, 
was the most common method in use for the final 
forwarding of a large percentage of the material 
required in the forward area, and it is with this 
portion of the subject that the suggestions about 
to be put forward are made. This method and 
the manner of detailing the parties was most 
wasteful, both of manpower and material, for the 
following reasons:-
(a) Despite attempts made to counteract the 
feeling, the infantry looked on carrying parties 
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in the light of a fatigue rather than a fighting duty 
and, in consequence of this, there was not the 
same interest taken in the work that the same 
men would have shown in their other regular 
duties. 
(b) This lack of interest resulted in two things: 
first, the men carried as little as they could, and, 
secondly, they very often ditched a portion of their 
load, if the opportunity offered. This resulted not 
only in lost manpower, but in damaged or lost 
material. 
(c) Such a carrying party was, in many cases, 
new to the work; was not familiar with the routes 
over which it had to go and, therefore, dependent 
on guides, who very often were none too familiar 
with the routes themselves, thus causing 
unnecessary delays or detours with resulting 
fatigue to the men. 
(d) This lack of knowledge of the route 
necessitated large parties keeping together with 
resulting heavier casualties. if under fire, and 
slowness of movement. 
Advantages of Permanent 
Carrying Parties 
In view of the above it is submitted that in order to overcome these conditions it is necessary to 
have some organization whose particular duty 
would be the forwarding of ammunition. 
engineering materials, rations and water in, the 
forward area. 
The value of such an organization would be 
hard to compute but in view of the experience 
already gained it is felt that a little investigation 
would show the advisability of giving it 
consideration. The following points should be 
noted in connection with this proposal:-
(a) The forwarding of ammunition, etc., 
would be its sole duty, (outside of fighting in an 
emergency), and therefore the men would see that 
any certain amount of material would be 
forwarded with the least loss of time or material 
as they would know that if the task was not 
completed one night it would have to be finished 
the next. 
(b) The personnel of such an organization 
would quickly learn all routes, locations of 
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dumps, headquarters, etc., in their area., thus 
cutting out the necessity for guides. The men 
could be sent out in smaller parties, thus 
eliminating the crowding which happened with 
large parties; unwieldy parties caused loss of time 
and a heavier percentage of casualties. They 
would also avoid bad spots in the routes, either 
from the point of bad walking or enemy fire. 
(c) An esprit-de-corps would gradually spring 
up in such an organization which would cause 
the men to put forth their best efforts thus cutting 
down manpower required to move certain 
amounts of supplies. 
(d) If this organization were equipped with 
the tumpline for carrying, the manpower required 
would be cut down from 50 percent to 75 percent. 
and over as previously explained. 
This organization, to be a definite success, 
would have to be run entirely separate from the 
infantry and under its own administration in a 
similar manner to the Forestry Corps, the light 
railways, etc. 
These special units to be attached to divisions 
or brigades for work as required. 
Suggested Tumpline Organization 
~e following is a proposed scheme of the 
.l. establishment and method of work of such 
an organization:-
(a) There would be four companies formed 
for each division of the force, each one having a 
strength of 100 all ranks as per establishment 
given further on. 
(b) These companies to be controlled from a 
headquarters of the new formation which would 
detail 4 companies for every divisional sector and 
these companies, through a group commander 
or adjutant, would take their orders as to 
divisions with whom they should work, from the 
HQ of the Army holding that portion of the line. 
(c) The whole organization to come under the 
direct control of its own headquarters at GHQ. 
(d) Divisional sectors to be divided into sub-
sectors in accordance with the number of 
brigades holding the front and a company 
allotted to each sub-sector and one company 
between the artillery and divisional troops, 
when necessary, or retained as a reserve or for 
reliefs. 
(e) As far as possible the four companies of 
the divisional sector be retained in one area as 
long as the situation permits and inter-company 
reliefs carried on as the nature of the work 
demands. 
(f) When big operations were pending, two 
companies to be withdrawn from the non-active 
divisional sectors and moved to the coming battle 
front early enough to become familiar with the 
new ground. 
(g) These additional companies to be attached 
to divisional sectors as required. 
(h) The headquarters of the formation to run 
a central school to train reinforcements; 5 
percent. of the strength of the total companies 
should be under training at all times. 
Proposed Establishment 
of a Tumpline Company 
Detail 
I 
Officers 
Other 
Totals 
Ranks 
Captains l 1 
Subalterns 2 2 
CSM&CQMS 2 2 
Sergeants 
i 
4 4 
Corporals i 4 4 
Privates 87 (a) 87 
Totals 3 97 100 
(a) Includes 2 cooks. 2 stretcher-bearers and 3 batmen. 
Note: Company divided into HQ and four sections. HQ 
composed of three officers. CSM and CQMS. 2 cooks. 2 
stretcher bearers and 3 batmen. Section composed of 
l Sergeant. l Corporal and 20 Privates. One subaltern 
in charge of two sections. The four companies for each 
division comprising the force could be originally drawn 
from the force, one from each infantry brigade and one 
from divisional troops and struck off in the same way 
as LTMB personnel. and reinforcements demanded to 
replace. Each section and HQ of the company to have a 
LTMB cart for transport of blankets, cooking utensils, 
etc. 
In addition to this independent formation, 
every fighting unit in the force should have a 
section of men trained in the use of the tumpline 
who could he used in an emergency or as 
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Tumpline Loadls 
Number of Men Percentage Weight Required to Carry of Load of Load Remarks 
(in lbs.) With Without manpower 
tumpline tumpline saved 
Vickers's Gw1 93 1 2 50% Gun in case weighs 39lbs.; Tripod 54lbs. 
4 Belt Boxes 92 1 2 50% Each box weighs 23 lbs. 
2 Boxes Lewis Gun 
94 1 2 50% 
ammunition 
This load only up to 1 mile on good trail. '1\vo boxes of 6 
Stokes' Shells, 3 boxes 126 1 1 1;2 33 l/3% 
shells ordinary load for long distance. No saving in 
manpower but shells kept in clean condition. 3 shells in 
sandbag weigh 33 lbs. 
Stokes' 3-in. Gun 108 1 3 66 2/3% Gun bbl. weighs 49 lbs. Base plate 30 lbs. Bipod 29 lbs. 
1 OCXl rounds Small 
79 I 2 50% All round easy load for tun1pline. 
Arms Ammunition 
20CXl rounds Small Too heavy for regular work; only for short distance in 
158 1 4 75% 
Arms Ammunition emergency. 
3 Boxes Hales' grenades 120 1 3 662/3% Too heavy for regular works; 1Wo boxes much better load. 
3 Boxes Mills' 75 1 1 1;2 33 1/3% Very easy load; could be carried very long distances. 
4 Boxes Mills' 100 1 2 50% 
Good ordinary load; for emergency can be easily increased 
to6boxes. 
2 x 6-in Newtons' 106 1 2 50% 
4 x 18lb shells 96 1 2 20% Particularly useful for salvaging; the san1e anummition 
2 x 4.5-in shells 70 1 2 50% boxed can be carried much more easily. 
20 x 4.5-in charges 116 1 2 50% 
12 Shovels 67 1 2215 58% Particularly easy load. 
12 Picks 78 1 3 662/3% 
115lbs 
1 Bale Sandbags 1 4 75% Saves breaking bales. 
dry 
2 Rolls Barbed Wire 70 1 2 50% \\eight including two stakes. Single roll weigl1S 33lbs. 
6 sheets Corrigated 
96 
Iron. heavy 
1 3 662/3% 
lO sheets Corrigated 
110 1 31/3 70% 
Very difficult to carry if windy. but this also applies to 
Iron, light ordinary carrying 
12 Stakes, short 66 1 1 1;5 16 2/3% 
lO Stakes, !11ediwn 70 1 1 1/4 20% 
8 Stakes, long 72 1 1 3;5 37 L-2% 
Roll telephone wire 64 1 2 50% 
Roll telephone wire 160 1 2-4 50-75% Too heavy for practical work. 
Gas projector and 
142 1 3 66 2/3% 
Projector 66lbs. Base plate 16lbs. Gas dnm1 empty 33 
cylinder lbs.; full 60 lbs. 
4 Tins ofWlter 104 1 2 50% In the usual way tins as a rule arrive half empty. 
70-90 
Ration sack (32-40 1 less meat 
rations); Meat sent in 95-120 2-21;2 500/o - 600/o Sacks are made of burlap or canvas, and hold 5-6 sandbags 
separate box full 1 
ration 
1 case Biscuits 68 1 2 50% 
Difficult loads for ordinary carriers. 
2 cases Bully Beef 90 1 2 50% 
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occasion required when the regular companies 
were not available. 
For an infantry battalion, 10 men under a 
lance corporal should be sufficient; batteries of 
artillery and engineering companies should 
manage with 5 trained men. Machine gun 
companies should have sufficient trained men 
in each gun section to care for the gun and belt 
boxes and to replace casualties during an action; 
in fact, I would advocate every member of a 
machine gun company and Lewis gun crews in 
infantry battalions to be trained in the use of the 
tumpline, as well as a couple of men in each 
platoon whose duty it would be to carry in attack 
a dozen shovels or picks for use in digging in. 
The resultant increased efficiency in action and 
the savings in man-power should be apparent to 
the most casual observer. 
Stretcher bearers of battalions and bearer 
sections of field ambulances should be trained 
in the carrying of slightly wounded with the 
tumpline. In this connection we experimented 
by utilizing the tumpline in carrying the stretcher, 
but not enough was done to enable me to 
recommend its use, although I feel that it could 
be developed along the lines I was working on. 
All these men could be trained at the school 
maintained by the new formation. 
In a future campaign, conditions may have 
changed so that we will have no trench warfare 
as we knew it during the late war, which would 
do away with the advantage that would otherwise 
be in evidence from the men becoming familiar 
with one particular sector. Under conditions 
where the battle area was a rapidly changing one, 
these trained men would however be in a better 
position to grasp the situation and handle their 
work than would troops drawn from the fighting 
units who had had no special training. In open 
warfare, the carrying troops would have to work 
in very close liaison with the units of the division 
they were allotted to, and some readjustment of 
the method of command laid down for trench 
warfare. would have to be made. 
On the previous page are given comparative 
particulars of loads, carried, with and without 
the tumpline, in the Canadian Corps during the 
Great War. 
There are many other details that could be 
gone into but the scope of these notes does not 
require it and enough has been set out to give a 
general idea of what was accomplished and what 
might be done in the future. 
Frederick Ross Phelan was born in 
Montreal on 8 August 1885. At the outbreak 
of the First World War, he joined the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force. He served in France and 
in 1917 was appointed Staff Captain, 11th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade. When war ended, 
he was Deputy Assistant Quartermaster 
General at Canadian Corps Headquarters 
with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. During 
the Second World War, Phelan served in a 
number of capacities including commander 
of all Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Units 
in the United Kingdom, commander of 
Canadian forces in Newfoundland, and 
Director General Reserve Army. He retired 
from the army in 1945 with the rank of 
major-general. 
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